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(289) 
DEBATE 
COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:   
PRO AND CON 
In this thoughtful and intricate cross-disciplinary debate, Profes-
sors Eric W. Orts, of Penn’s Wharton School, and Cary Coglianese, of 
Penn’s Law School, discuss the benefits and disadvantages of collabo-
rative public policy decision making in the environmental context.  It 
is no exaggeration to say that each year the world grows ever more 
aware of the nature of the environmental problems we face, and yet 
critical policy solutions continue to remain beyond the grasp of even 
the most interested parties. 
Professor Orts argues that it is time to embrace a different policy-
making approach—that of collaborative environmental lawmaking.  
He argues that “the view that centralized governments acting alone 
will arrive at ‘correct’ solutions . . . begs the question of incommen-
surable values and the various people who hold them.”  Professor 
Orts’s skepticism of the independence of political and other govern-
mental actors in a world in which “lobbyists and campaign financiers . 
. . play large and often decisive roles in th[e public policymaking] 
process” leads him to conclude that “in many situations, it makes bet-
ter sense to trust less in the traditional centralized process of envi-
ronmental lawmaking and to consider more frequently the alternative 
of engaging in collaborative environmental law.”   
Professor Coglianese responds that collaborative environmental 
law is “not at all feasible for making real-world decisions about major 
environmental problems,” and that this policymaking approach “in-
troduces new types of predictable and serious problems.”  He cautions 
that “[t]he issue is not whether policymakers should reach out to af-
fected interests and members of the public.  Rather, the issue lies with 
the purpose of public engagement.”  Professor Coglianese contends 
that, by making agreement the primary aim of policymaking, collabo-
rative environmental law actually conveys a willingness to give in to in-
terested parties in pursuit of the “holy grail” of consensus.  Instead, 
Professor Coglianese urges that public “engagement should be used 
with another goal in mind . . . mak[ing] the best possible decision [to] 
. . . best advance[] the overall public interest.” 
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     OPENING STATEMENT 
The Case for Collaborative Environmental Law 
Eric W. Orts† 
A recent suggestion put forward by a number of academics has 
been to consider one or another version of what I will call “collabora-
tive environmental law” to address different kinds of environmental 
problems.  Different labels have been used to describe this approach, 
including an emphasis on contracting, negotiating, and bargaining as 
methods of “doing” environmental law.  I will use the term “collabora-
tive environmental law” to refer to a general form of lawmaking that 
adopts a deliberative and participatory process designed to include 
not only government officials (and their designated scientific and 
economic experts), but also the representatives of a range of interests 
in civil society who will be affected by legal rules and decisions con-
cerning a specific environmental problem, including businesses, citi-
zens’ groups, and nongovernmental organizations.  The principal aim 
of such a collaborative process is to arrive at a negotiated deal or 
agreement about how to treat a particular environmental problem in 
its specific context.  My general claim is that this approach can work 
well for a large number of modern environmental problems.  I do not 
claim that collaborative environmental law should replace traditional 
environmental law as the best approach to all problem contexts and 
situations.  But I argue that this approach makes sense for at least 
some kinds of environmental problems in contrast to more traditional 
methods of lawmaking—namely, common law development, federal 
or state legislation, international treaties, and formal or informal ad-
ministrative regulation. 
Allow me first to argue against a few epistemological assumptions 
that some policymakers and academics make about the “best” way to 
do environmental law.  These assumptions tend to reinforce tradi-
tional approaches.  Many academics harbor a false confidence in the 
superiority of modern science and economics to provide concrete, 
generalized answers to most, if not all, environmental policy ques-
tions.  I believe instead that in many circumstances, there are no 
“right answers” to be given by science or economics to many specific 
environmental problems.  As a result, a centralized lawmaking ap-
 
 † Guardsmark Professor, Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department, The 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
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proach directed by allegedly “expert” government officials cannot be 
relied upon to yield objectively correct solutions.  Decentralized ap-
proaches to environmental law would conform more closely to the de-
scriptive and normative complexity of the problems. 
Science and economics are helpful to diagnose some important 
dimensions of issues.  For example, science can provide reliable evi-
dence that exposure to particular chemicals in sufficient doses is likely 
to prove harmful to human health (as well as to other animals and 
plants).  In other words, scientific methods estimate and quantify en-
vironmental risks.  But science cannot provide answers to questions 
about how much risk is too much to impose on a particular popula-
tion in specific situations.  Environmental risks are instead routinely 
balanced against other considerations, such as convenience, volun-
tariness of the assumption of the risk, and economic values. 
Similarly, economic analysis can provide useful information about 
how much a proposed environmental solution or prophylactic meas-
ure may cost, as well as an approximation of some of the benefits of 
reducing environmental pollution or other risks.  But economic analy-
sis cannot capture all of the values relevant to a particular environ-
mental choice.  When economics attempts to capture these non-
economic values—such as natural beauty or an ethical appreciation of 
biodiversity—it fails.  A notorious example is the use of “contingent 
valuation” to attempt to measure the value of a pristine natural fea-
ture in hypothetical dollars, such as in the survey question, “How 
much would you be willing to pay for a clear view of the Grand Can-
yon?”  Simply to ask the question is to miss the point. 
Given the space constraints here, I will simply assert rather than 
argue for the position that the imperial views of either science or eco-
nomics (or both together) cannot yield final policy answers to many of 
the most difficult environmental problems.  Instead, these problems 
often involve a clash of values—pitting environmentalists against busi-
ness firms, citizens against consumers—with the government fre-
quently in the middle.  Adding to the complexity, governments oper-
ate at different levels:  local, regional, national, and global.  When 
competing values are implicated—what my Wharton colleague, Pro-
fessor Nien-hê Hsieh, describes well as “incommensurable values”—
they cannot be reduced to a common currency and traded off to find 
one correct, objectively rational solution.  Instead, different risks and 
benefits have to be identified and negotiated, and tough choices must 
often be made.  When there is no objectively right answer, then both 
individuals and society must “muddle through” (to use Professor 
Charles Lindblom’s famous phrase) and try to find the best practical 
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answer possible for difficult problems.  The best approach discovered 
so far has been to apply deliberative, participatory democratic proc-
esses to yield negotiated compromises to address specific kinds of 
problems. 
What does a collaborative approach to environmental law mean in 
practice?  Allow me to describe a general method and provide a few 
illustrations. 
First, one should start with a definition of the problem context 
and features of a particular environmental issue.  Important dimen-
sions include the size and scale of the problem, its nature in terms of a 
physical and scientific understanding, the economic interests at stake, 
the political considerations involved, and the different kinds of values 
implicated. 
Centralized regulatory approaches often assume that the nation-
state—embodied by the United States government or unitary national 
governments elsewhere—is the appropriate place to start.  The con-
text in which different kinds of environmental issues arise, however, 
may recommend a focus at lower or higher governmental levels.  The 
principle of “subsidiarity,” originated in Europe, is helpful here.  It 
recommends that any specific environmental problem should be ad-
dressed at the lowest governmental level possible.  The reason is that 
the complexity of many environmental problems is more easily and 
more satisfactorily resolved at a smaller scale, if feasible.  For some 
problems, such as global climate change or ozone-layer depletion, the 
relevant definition of the problem context is planetary.  For others, 
such as the siting of a power plant or a waste processing facility, the 
appropriate level is often local or regional. 
Second, once the problem context is defined and understood, the 
next step is to identify and convene the relevant interests to address 
the issue.  Governmental actors will often need to play a leading role 
because those who are contributing to an environmental problem may 
not always be willing to convene voluntarily.  Privately oriented busi-
nesses and individuals tend to deny the harmful public consequences 
of their actions.  Collective action problems and the well-known “trag-
edy of the commons” describe most environmental problems, and of-
ten it is only the government—as the maker and enforcer of coercive 
law—which can effectively bring everyone to the negotiating table. 
At this point, however, some scholars and policymakers quickly 
abdicate and prefer to delegate large powers to the government to 
“solve” a particular environmental problem through the application of 
alleged scientific and economic expertise.  Thus the regulatory state is 
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born and expands, encouraging and encouraged by imperial claims of 
scientific and economic methodologies (sometimes devolving into 
ideologies) to supply policy answers.  It is true that governmental 
agencies can frequently produce and collect relevant scientific and 
economic information efficiently and objectively.  But the view that 
centralized governments acting alone will arrive at “correct” solu-
tions—even if a notice-and-comment procedure solicits a range of 
opinions in the promulgation of administrative regulations—begs the 
question of incommensurable values and the various people who hold 
them.  Democratic legislatures and executives may have the imprima-
tur of legitimacy through periodic elections, but everyone knows that 
lobbyists and campaign financiers (if not their seedier relatives who 
engage in old-fashioned bribery and corruption) play large and often 
decisive roles in this process such that the government’s position on 
many issues is often determined behind the scenes.  The ideal of a 
truly objective Environmental Protection Agency or Office of Man-
agement and Budget is a myth. 
Therefore, in many situations, it makes better sense to trust less in 
the traditional centralized process of environmental lawmaking and to 
consider more frequently the alternative of engaging in collaborative 
environmental law.  Again, a collaborative process will not always 
work.  Sometimes a big problem may require a big government solu-
tion.  However, in a world in which many environmental problems 
have become increasingly complex (and often seemingly intractable), 
it makes sense to expand our thinking.  Creative and effective solu-
tions to specific problems may result from collaborative engagement 
in good faith among interested parties, even when their fundamental 
values may differ.  In a world in which a religious-like belief in science 
or economics as infallible disciplines that give definitive answers to big 
policy questions has been exploded, there is really no other choice.  
To address many of the serious environmental problems that face the 
world today, there is no better course than for everyone involved to sit 
down, talk and listen to each other, and work out compromise solu-
tions with legally enforceable consequences in the various contexts in 
which these problems arise. 
Advantages for collaborative environmental law include a greater 
sensitivity to encouraging innovation and creativity, rather than rely-
ing on previous approaches or borrowing from old laws or precedents 
of dubious effectiveness, as well as a more active engagement of both 
the “regulated” and the “regulators” in committing to new regulatory 
schemes.  Balancing different values through deliberation and nego-
tiation may lead to new “win-win” solutions or other compromises that 
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hurt one side or another less than they might otherwise be hurt (e.g., 
a regulation that is either less costly or more respectful of the envi-
ronment and therefore a “second best” if not a “first best” option).  
Collaborative environmental law may also help to elude the well-
known “ossification” of traditional administrative regulation and ham-
strung, slow-moving legislatures. 
There are also potential disadvantages of collaboration, and they 
may sometimes outweigh the benefits.  For example, collaborative 
administrative law in the form of negotiated rule making has been 
criticized as too time-consuming and expensive.  The increased eco-
nomic cost of any particular method of regulation is certainly relevant, 
and sometimes this consideration may be decisive.  But it’s not the 
only value that should be measured. 
Also, collaborative environmental law addressing similar issues in 
different places may yield inconsistent results.  In the siting of power 
plants or waste facilities, for instance, some communities may choose 
to accept a greater degree of health risk than others.  In this context, 
it may make sense for centrally determined regulations to specify 
minimal levels of safety for certain risks and then to allow collabora-
tive negotiated solutions to proceed within these limits.  Or, to take 
another example, some “habitat conservation plans” to preserve en-
dangered species may turn out to be less effective than others, an in-
evitable result of applying different solutions in different situations.  
Lawyers may tend to overvalue consistency, however, and this hobgob-
lin should not prevent the use of collaborative approaches that make 
sense and, when taken collectively, promise to improve the ability of 
environmental law to address some of the most challenging problems 
effectively, efficiently, and democratically. 
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REBUTTAL 
The Case against Collaborative Environmental Law 
Cary Coglianese† 
Professor Eric Orts explains that the “principal aim” of collabora-
tive environmental law is “to arrive at a negotiated deal or agreement 
about how to treat a particular environmental problem in its specific 
context.”  This common understanding of collaborative environ-
mental law provides the focal point for clarifying my concerns with 
this approach to environmental policymaking.  I have no problem 
with policymakers encouraging public deliberation and seeking ex-
tensive input, nor do I quarrel with trying to increase participation or 
policymaking at local levels, but it would be a serious mistake to estab-
lish deal-making as the primary goal of domestic environmental poli-
cymaking. 
Let me first clarify one conceptual distinction.  Collaborative envi-
ronmental law may hold certain affinities with localism, but policy-
making can be collaborative (that is, it can place primacy on winning 
agreement) whether its scale is international, national, regional, state, 
or local.  Professor Orts’s critiques of undue centralized national poli-
cymaking, and his invocation of the European subsidiarity principle, 
are thoughtful and perhaps even persuasive, but they do not help in 
deciding whether to favor collaboration.  Collaboration requires its 
own separate defense. 
Given this, why would criticisms of centralized, national policy-
making find their way into a defense of collaboration?  They appear to 
serve the same purpose as Professor Orts’s discussion of science’s in-
ability to generate determinate policy answers.  They make collabora-
tion look good by making the alternative look bad.  Indeed, much of 
Professor Orts’s case for collaborative environmental law is actually a 
case against the unattractive alternative of having centralized experts 
make major public decisions in ivory-tower isolation, taking nothing 
into account but cold scientific and economic facts. 
There are choices other than decision making by quarantined 
central planners and decision making by collaboration.  Without treat-
ing public deliberation as a negotiation, and without viewing their 
 
 † Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; Director, Penn Program on Regulation. 
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primary objective as the brokering of a deal, policymakers can, and 
regularly do, engage in extensive consultation and engagement.  They 
hold public hearings and convene interactive roundtable dialogues to 
gather information that can improve their decisions.  They pick up 
the telephone, ask questions of affected individuals and organizations, 
and listen to what they have to say.  Policymakers not only meet indi-
vidually with affected interests, they also consult with elected and ap-
pointed officials from other governmental bodies.  All of these efforts 
to obtain input come in addition to the normal review of feedback ac-
companying the formal notice-and-comment procedure used by ad-
ministrative agencies. 
To question collaboration, then, is not to question public partici-
pation.  The issue is not whether policymakers should reach out to af-
fected interests and members of the public.  Rather, the issue lies with 
the purpose of public engagement.  Should public engagement be pur-
sued in order to base environmental law on a deal struck by certain 
affected parties?  Or should such engagement be used with another 
goal in mind, such as gathering information policymakers need to 
make the best possible decision consistent with relevant statutory ob-
jectives or with what best advances the overall public interest? 
Professor Orts favors making agreement the principal aim of 
many significant environmental policies because, he says, “there is no 
better course than for everyone involved to sit down, talk and listen to 
each other, and work out compromise solutions.”  As appealing as this 
Rawlsian aspiration may be, it is not at all feasible for making real-
world decisions about major environmental problems.  Environmental 
impacts are inherently diffuse, affecting large numbers of people; it is 
simply not possible for everyone affected by major environmental 
problems to sit down and talk things over.  As a result, even when a 
collaborative environmental process is used to achieve agreement, the 
broader public is not necessarily well served by what the selective 
group of interested parties sitting around the negotiation table de-
cides. 
Professor Orts suggests that placing a primacy on agreement can 
better encourage participants to find creative “win-win” solutions, as 
well as provide a better opportunity for breaking governmental grid-
lock.  Negotiated decisions may indeed be better in comparison to de-
cisions made by government officials who lock themselves in their 
closets when developing new policies.  But officials don’t do this, and I 
am aware of no credible evidence showing that the quixotic quest for 
consensus leads to better policy outcomes when compared to the real-
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istic alternative of government decision making following robust pub-
lic participation.  On the contrary, what we know from past attempts 
at collaborative environmental law is that making agreement the goal 
often introduces one or more of at least five types of policy problems. 
1.  Tractability over Importance 
When agreement is the goal, collaborative groups tend to give 
more attention to those issues that are most tractable—not necessarily 
those that are most important.  I have written elsewhere about this 
problem in connection with two major consensus-based initiatives 
from the 1990s.  The Enterprise for the Environment (E4E) initiative 
launched by former United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Administrator William Ruckelshaus sought to forge agreement 
between business, government, and environmentalists on a diagnosis 
of problems with existing environmental law and on specific legislative 
remedies.  When these objectives proved too controversial, E4E fo-
cused instead on the more attainable (but much less useful) goal of 
drafting a broad vision statement for an ideal environmental protec-
tion system.  A similar fate befell the EPA’s major, four-year undertak-
ing called the Common Sense Initiative (CSI).  CSI sought to develop 
consensus over ways to transform the current system of environmental 
regulation in six sectors; however, in the end, CSI only really pro-
duced narrow, tractable projects, such as the development of training 
manuals, case studies, and public education campaigns. 
2.  Imprecision 
People can often more easily reach agreement over imprecise 
terms.  Each side can interpret vague words or broad principles in a 
light favorable to its own interests, each thinking it has won more (or 
lost less) than its counterparts think.  When agreement is the princi-
pal goal, we can expect to see resulting outcomes that have greater 
ambiguities.  For example, in the E4E initiative, the final consensus 
report read like little more than a book of platitudes.  Few could seri-
ously disagree with E4E’s general call for a better environmental pro-
tection system, but the devil (and the conflict) lay in the details that 
had been pushed aside in order to reach agreement. 
3.  Lowest Common Denominator 
When securing agreement becomes the primary aim, each party 
effectively gains a veto over the outcome.  If an agreement does result, 
it is likely to reflect little more than the lowest common denominator 
of the various parties.  In this way, the turn to collaborative environ-
mental law would transform domestic environmental decision making 
into something akin to multilateral decision making at the interna-
tional level.  Whether in negotiating treaties or reaching agreement in 
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the United Nations Security Council, it is not uncommon for multilat-
eral action to reflect no more than what is acceptable to the actor with 
the greatest objections.  As evidenced by the international commu-
nity’s response to global climate change, this is hardly a promising way 
to make progress solving major environmental problems. 
4.  Increased Time and Resources 
As Professor Orts notes, collaborative environmental law has been 
criticized for taking longer to generate decisions.  If each party effec-
tively holds a veto, then much time will be needed for all negotiating 
parties to present their concerns and hear how others respond.  To 
reach agreement, deliberation needs to continue until everyone 
agrees or decides they can live with an outcome.  Empirical studies of 
federal negotiated rule making confirm that seeking consensus does 
not speed up the policymaking process.  Complaints about the 
amount of time and energy demanded of participants in collaborative 
environmental processes are legion. 
5.  Additional Conflict 
Although collaborative environmental law seeks to resolve con-
flict, it actually can add new and unproductive sources of controversy.  
For example, conflicts arise over who gets to participate in collabora-
tive groups; in some cases, lawsuits have been threatened or even filed 
when organizations are not invited to sit at the negotiation table.  Fur-
ther, even when a deal is successfully brokered, conflicts arise over the 
precise meaning of what the parties agreed to and whether subse-
quent governmental action comports with that understanding.  Nei-
ther of these additional sources of conflict arises outside the context 
of collaborative environmental law.  Perhaps not surprisingly, empiri-
cal research shows that negotiated environmental regulations are chal-
lenged in court more frequently than comparable regulations formu-
lated through alternative participatory procedures. 
These five pathologies of collaboration arise not only with major 
federal initiatives but also with regional, state, and local attempts to 
make agreement the basis of public policy.  When California’s legisla-
ture unanimously passed a bill restructuring the state’s electricity 
markets in the mid-1990s, for example, it enacted a compromise solu-
tion that had been forged in an unusual “multi-stakeholder” negotia-
tion process convened by the relevant legislative committee.  When 
rolling electricity blackouts occurred in 2001, wreaking havoc on the 
state’s consumers and forcing utility companies into financial crisis, 
Californians discovered the deal’s serious flaws. 
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Collaborative policymaking is clearly no panacea.  On this point, 
Professor Orts would surely agree, as he quite sensibly recognizes that 
at least sometimes collaboration’s disadvantages outweigh its asserted 
advantages.  But in advocating deal making as the principal way of ad-
dressing many significant and vexing environmental challenges, Pro-
fessor Orts fails to acknowledge the full extent of collaboration’s dis-
advantages.  This is not to say, of course, that alternatives to 
collaboration will always lead to effective and efficient outcomes ei-
ther.  Rather it is simply that making agreement the holy grail of poli-
cymaking introduces new types of predictable and serious problems in 
addition to the risks of failure that will inevitably accompany decision 
making over uncertain and complex problems. 
The benefits to be gained from assuming these risks from collabo-
ration are much smaller than Professor Orts suggests, if not entirely 
nonexistent.  For one thing, practitioners of the art of negotiation 
have long advised against trying to negotiate over policy questions that 
involve a clash of fundamental values.  Most advocates of collaboration 
have therefore favored negotiation only when policy problems have 
multiple, discrete facets that can be traded off against each other in 
hammering out a compromise.  Attempts at collaboration seem least 
likely to result in agreement in those settings where Professor Orts ad-
vocates its use, namely over problems that evoke conflicts over values 
that “cannot be reduced to a common currency and traded off.” 
Whatever conceivable benefits collaboration might offer can be 
readily achieved by alternative means that do not introduce the dis-
tinctive pathologies that arise from a quest for consensus.  As I noted 
at the outset, there are other ways of making environmental lawmak-
ing participatory without structuring it as a negotiation exercise.  In 
the end, if there is a case at all to be made for collaborative environ-
mental law, that case favors instead ensuring that responsible govern-
mental decision making is accompanied by serious efforts at public 
engagement—not that it is replaced with the much different aim of 
deal brokering. 
 
300 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 289 
PENNumbra 
CLOSING STATEMENT 
Eric W. Orts 
Professor Coglianese does not like “deal making” as a method of 
creating law, but one wonders what kind of political and legal process 
he imagines taking place, even when the command-and-control legis-
lation and rule making that he seems to favor are employed.  Bis-
marck famously compared lawmaking to the production of sausage 
and is said to have proclaimed that if you want to retain respect for 
the law and enjoy sausage, then you shouldn’t look too closely at how 
either one is actually made.  In a modern democracy, the process of 
lawmaking is often, if not always, a product of negotiations and deal 
making at some level.  One principled argument in favor of collabora-
tive law is that it can be structured explicitly to recognize that lawmak-
ing is the result of conflicting interests and values—represented 
through various organized groups (businesses, industry groups, labor 
unions, public interest groups, religious organizations, etc.)—and that 
it may often make sense to make this process transparent.  Professor 
Coglianese attacks collaborative law as an unappealing form of “deal 
brokering,” but one should then ask in return how he believes the 
status quo works?  I would suggest that traditional environmental law 
in the form of national and state legislation—or the delegation to 
administrative regulation—is just as much a product of “deal-
brokering” as collaborative alternatives.  But the deals are often made 
in back rooms (though perhaps no longer smoky ones).  Armadas of 
lobbyists and special interests participate in the making of traditional 
command-and-control regulation.  In fact, back-room deals and dan-
ger of corruption arguably pose a greater risk in centralized lawmak-
ing because the processes are more easily hidden.  Collaborative law 
offers greater transparency because in a public forum the arguments 
that each side brings to the table must stand up to criticism.  I there-
fore plead guilty to the charge of harboring Rawlsian tendencies to 
the extent that I believe that we should create political and legal proc-
esses that support and encourage arguments based on a Rawlsian 
“public reason” rather than assertions of self-interest and raw power.  
Collaborative lawmaking, when properly structured, can help to 
achieve this ideal better than traditional alternatives—at least in some 
circumstances. 
Professor Coglianese is right to point out that command-and-
control regulation—and other centralized alternatives—can be struc-
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tured to include public participation.  For example, the informal rule-
making process of administrative law provides for “notice and com-
ment,” and agencies may sometimes take these comments seriously 
and tweak the final rules in response.  But notice that this process still 
assumes that the administrative agencies themselves “know best.”  
Hidden in Professor Coglianese’s defense of traditional lawmaking is a 
trust in the expertise of administrative agencies as public servants.  But 
he doesn’t reveal the basis for this trust.  To some extent—and again 
in many circumstances—I agree that agency expertise plays a very 
positive role in lawmaking.  As stated in my initial argument, adminis-
trative agencies are well-positioned to gather and even sponsor rele-
vant scientific and economic evidence.  Their experience in drafting 
good regulations and their collective knowledge of the overall frame-
work of law in a given field—especially in expansive legal areas such as 
environmental law—should be given credit, and, to some extent, def-
erence (as recognized in the forgiving Chevron standard of judicial re-
view of agency actions). 
Notice, however, that Professor Coglianese does not say what 
higher authoritative standard the central policymakers consult when 
they make their final decision.  He says that after soliciting informa-
tion from the general public, the central policymakers will then “make 
the best possible decision consistent with relevant statutory objectives 
or with what best advances the overall public interest.”  There is a big 
jurisprudential difference between following statutory objectives and 
doing what one sees as best in the public interest (legal positivism ver-
sus Dworkinian principles).  But my main criticism of Professor 
Coglianese’s view is that he does not reveal the foundation for his im-
plicit faith in the virtues of centralized policymaking.  My skepticism is 
grounded in the reality that government “experts” are usually bureau-
crats responding to heavy political influence (usually, in the federal 
context, the President’s views and those of his supporters).  If a Re-
publican is in power, then administrative agencies tend to be pro-
business.  Democratic administrations tend to be more favorable to 
environmentalists.  High-level politics results in an unhealthy seesaw 
effect that may not translate into the “best policy” envisioned by Pro-
fessor Coglianese.  Collaborative environmental law may sometimes 
serve the public interest better by focusing on particular problems and 
trying to solve them directly—without the determinism of “great poli-
tics” controlling the legislative and administrative machinery.  Of 
course, one has to elect leaders who will entertain using this kind of 
approach when warranted.  But collaborative lawmaking methods can 
be adopted by both moderate Republicans and Democrats—and they 
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have worked for parties of different ideological stripes in Europe and 
elsewhere. 
Professor Coglianese’s primary response to my plea to consider 
collaborative law as an alternative method of doing environmental law 
is to declare that I am on a “quest” to replace other alternatives and 
that I see collaborative environmental law as a “holy grail.”  But this is 
a mischaracterization of my argument.  I am not saying that a collabo-
rative method (which is not, by the way, equivalent to “consensus”) 
should replace all other methods or even that it should be elevated to 
be the principal method of lawmaking.  My claim is more modest.  I 
contend only that it makes sense to use collaborative methods in some 
circumstances, and other methods (e.g., traditional command-and-
control, market-based variations, informational regulation, or even a 
“do nothing” approach) in other circumstances.  By overstating my 
claim, Professor Coglianese seems for some reason to feel threatened 
by the mere suggestion that collaborative approaches may sometimes 
make sense. 
Professor Coglianese is also right to point out instances in which a 
collaborative approach to lawmaking has failed to achieve positive 
outcomes.  I don’t know the details of the case of California’s deregu-
lation of electricity (and I’m not sure how it fits into a discussion of 
environmental law), but let’s grant that fundamental mistakes were 
made.  Collaborative law is, I agree, no panacea.  But anecdotal evi-
dence that a particular use of collaborative lawmaking didn’t work 
isn’t dispositive—just as pointing to a bad command-and-control stat-
ute isn’t a convincing argument against the use of statutes. 
Similarly, it is true that the Common Sense Initiative that at-
tempted to engage industry groups in a European-style collaborative 
approach to regulation did not lead to great success.  Yet a post-
mortem might instead focus on what went wrong—perhaps with an 
eye to whether the government wielded a credible or meaningful 
threat of less desirable regulation if no agreement was otherwise 
reached—rather than simplistically declaring it an example of an in-
evitably failed approach.  Similar approaches seem to have worked in 
Europe, and it might be worth inquiring about the differences. 
If one looks, one can find successful examples of collaborative en-
vironmental law in the United States.  Traditional approaches have 
had an especially difficult time addressing certain kinds of environ-
mental problems that involve many sources of pollution with many 
individual contributors.  Non-point source water pollution and nonat-
tainment of basic air quality standards in major cities are two exam-
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ples.  Given the long-standing intractability of these problems (re-
sponding indirectly to one of Professor Coglianese’s criticisms), it 
makes sense to consider alternative approaches.  A collaborative ex-
ample appears in the CALFED San Francisco Bay program examined 
by Professors Jody Freeman and Daniel A. Farber in Modular Environ-
mental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005).  As its name implies, this 
program combined twenty-three state and federal agencies with juris-
diction over various environmental problems in the San Francisco Bay 
(and Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta) into a cooperative effort 
with other nongovernmental interests (including businesses and envi-
ronmental groups) which resulted in measurable success, though it 
depended also on political will to maintain it.  The example highlights 
a feature of collaborative law that Professor Coglianese overlooks in 
his quick dismissal of the European idea of subsidiarity.  For many en-
vironmental issues, it is important to focus attention on the right level 
or “place” of the problem.  Ecological and geographical dimensions 
are often more important than artificial political boundaries.  As the 
CALFED case illustrates, different governmental authorities are often 
implicated, and a “compact” or other collaborative approach can help 
to achieve the coordination needed in the specific context. 
In any event, Professor Coglianese should respond to my moder-
ate argument that collaborative environmental law should sometimes be 
considered, rather than setting up a straw man who claims that all en-
vironmental law should be collaborative.  Again, I agree that collabo-
rative environmental law has disadvantages as well as advantages—
costs and benefits in the largest sense of the words—but then so do 
traditional methods.  The five “pathologies” that Professor Coglianese 
finds in collaborative methods can infect traditional lawmaking as 
well.  (What language can be more vague and symbolic, for example, 
than the broad statutory goals expressed by the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act?  And the courts are filled with conflicts over the 
meaning of terms in traditional statutes too, such as whether green-
house gases count as “air pollution.”)  Perhaps Professor Coglianese 
would agree with what I am actually arguing:  that collaborative envi-
ronmental law is another possible approach that should be considered 
as an alternative method of regulation in a complex world with a host 
of different kinds of environmental problems demanding effective 
and efficient solutions that are responsive to conflicting interests and 
values.  The scholarly debate could then move on to a more useful ex-
amination of when collaborative approaches have worked and when 
they have not, which would then help to inform effective legal re-
sponses to future environmental problems.  For example, Project XL 
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was a collaborative approach to innovative rule making that was in-
tended to encourage creative alternatives to standard regulatory re-
quirements.  My reading of the academic assessments of this experi-
ment is that sometimes it worked, and sometimes it did not.  The 
same may be true for negotiated rule making, despite the increased 
costs documented by Professor Coglianese and others.  Some negoti-
ated rules may be substantively better than traditional ones in address-
ing the particular problem involved.  Proving only that negotiated 
rules are more costly—or litigated more frequently—does not show 
that they are substantively worse than traditional regulations in ad-
dressing particular problems. 
I conclude with one final example of an environmental problem 
that may prove more susceptible to environmental contracts or 
agreements rather than centralized lawmaking:  global climate 
change.  It is curious that Professor Coglianese employs this example 
as one illustrating a collaborative approach (unless one is to read him 
as saying that all international law is inherently and defectively col-
laborative!).  Instead, following a traditional lawmaking path, the 
Kyoto Protocol attempts to enlist all of the countries of the world 
(eventually) into a mandatory scheme to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases (mostly carbon dioxide and methane) that have 
been scientifically determined to be causing a general warming of the 
Earth’s atmosphere.  In other words, the not-so-secret dream of Kyoto 
is a traditional command-and-control solution with market-based 
variations of cap-and-trade or green taxes included for efficiency.  In 
my view, however, the complexities of the problem—considering es-
pecially the fervent economic competitiveness among nation-states 
and the harrowing divide between rich and poor regions of the 
world—suggest that a command-and-control solution with market-
based add-ons is doomed.  Instead, other regulatory methods may 
prove more effective, including collaborative agreements among 
companies to disclose and reduce their emissions (e.g., the Carbon 
Disclosure Project), as well as smaller agreements among countries, 
companies, and nonprofit environmental groups—perhaps under an 
umbrella of a larger post-Kyoto and post-Bali treaty encouraging tech-
nology transfers and subsidies for the development of new energy 
technologies, conservation practices, and adaptive behaviors.  At the 
very least, global climate change provides an example of why scholars 
and policymakers should not bind themselves too closely to traditional 
lawmaking models when considering new challenges.  Collaborative 
environmental law in the form of smaller environmental contracts, 
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deals, and ad hoc arrangements may do more good in this context 
than quixotic ambitions for a grand regulatory scheme to save the 
planet. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Cary Coglianese 
Professor Orts and I would have had nothing to debate if he de-
fended a notion of collaborative environmental law that simply coun-
seled policymakers to act with humility.  I would also have had little to 
say if he were encouraging policymakers to try harder to seek out the 
information and opinions held by those who will be affected by their 
decisions or to do more by way of creating broad, interactive delibera-
tions about policy options.  I am not even sure I would have been mo-
tivated to participate in this exchange if he had defended a still 
stronger principle:  namely, policymakers may in some cases permissi-
bly negotiate deals with affected interests, but only when doing so will 
best achieve (or at least not diminish the achievement of) appropriate 
policymaking objectives, such as implementing a statute or advancing 
the overall public interest.  Of course, Professor Orts probably would 
not disagree with any of these other positions, but as best as I can tell 
he advocates something much less modest. 
I say “as best as I can tell” because Professor Orts objects that I 
have misstated part of his initial argument.  Whereas in his Opening 
he claimed that collaborative environmental law “can work well for a 
large number of modern environmental problems” and suggested 
there was no better way to address “many of the serious environmental 
problems that face the world today,” he now says in his Closing that he 
only meant that collaboration “should sometimes be considered.”  He 
appears to be making a substantial retreat from his earlier claims, but 
I am happy to let the reader judge.  I will also leave it to the reader to 
decide whether, in characterizing Professor Orts as advocating deal-
making for “many significant and vexing environmental challenges,” I 
was setting up the straw position (as he claims I have) “that all envi-
ronmental law should be collaborative.” 
These accusations of mischaracterizations are just red herrings.  
Fundamentally, my objections to the case for collaborative environ-
mental law are unaffected by how frequently Professor Orts thinks col-
laboration should be used.  My objections are instead animated by the 
claim that policymakers should even occasionally assume deal-
brokering as their “principal aim”—precisely how Professor Orts and 
others have defined terms like collaboration and consensus-building.  
As I explained in my Rebuttal, my concern centers on what a policy-
maker’s goal should be, and this concern does not disappear simply by 
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saying policymakers should only “sometimes consider” an approach 
that substitutes an improper purpose for a proper one. 
In opposing collaborative environmental law in any context, I am 
not naïve about how policymaking actually gets made.  As a political 
scientist, I am fully aware of the role bargaining plays, as a practical 
and an empirical matter, in how things now work.  But I am also aware 
of the difference between is and ought.  One can accept a positive po-
litical economy account of policymaking that emphasizes interest ac-
commodation and bargaining, and yet at the same time deplore con-
verting that descriptive account into policymakers’ primary normative 
objective. 
Professor Orts suggests that at least collaborative environmental 
law moves deal making out of the back room.  Yet if that is the under-
lying motivation behind collaboration, I would have thought it better 
to advocate more direct solutions, such as strengthening transparency 
or reason-giving requirements.  Of course, even with these kinds of di-
rect requirements in place, individuals who want to deal improperly 
may well find ways to work around them.  I see no reason to think col-
laborative environmental law could do any better to prevent motivated 
individuals from engaging in subterfuge. 
Professor Orts accuses me of overly trusting public servants.  Yet 
anyone who worries about abuses of power still has much to worry 
about with collaborative environmental law.  Policymakers still control 
who participates in multi-stakeholder negotiations, and they influence 
how problems get defined and agendas are set—deep sources of 
power subject to much less oversight or review than substantive, on-
the-record decision making.  One charge I have heard made, particu-
larly by groups excluded from collaborative processes, is that in these 
processes policymakers tend to bring together like-minded actors and 
seek to use the mantel of collaboration as a political cover for out-
comes they already prefer. 
When it comes to bias, manipulation, and corruption, collabora-
tive environmental law might even make things worse in at least two 
important respects.  First, if policymakers are to be judged by whether 
they meet the primary goal of striking a deal, they presumably will try 
even harder to make sure a deal gets made—even if that means more 
ex parte communications or illegal side payments.  One thing partici-
pants in formal multi-stakeholder negotiations have reported is that 
they can make more progress toward a deal by working in the shad-
ows, during breaks and between meetings, than in the light of open 
negotiation sessions. 
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Second, if collaborative environmental law also means less central-
ized decision making (something Professor Orts appears to believe), it 
will become harder to monitor policymaking and ferret out improper 
conduct—simply because there will be more potential sites of corrup-
tion to oversee.  One reason we observe so many instances of corrup-
tion and back-room deals in our capital cities is because the media, 
watchdog groups, and government prosecutors concentrate their at-
tention there.  Oversight would no doubt become more difficult with 
policymaking authority distributed broadly across a series of ad hoc 
negotiating groups. 
Professor Orts also says that by arguing against collaborative envi-
ronmental law, I must be a fan of “command-and-control” regulation.  
Perhaps some readers will agree with him.  I have no doubt, though, 
that current and former students of mine who read this exchange will 
find much humor in his accusation.  That is because, at some early 
juncture in most of my regulatory courses, a student will use the 
phrase “command-and-control regulation”—prompting me to launch 
into a sermon against those words.  I begin by explaining that I am 
probably the only one who will ever counsel them against using 
“command-and-control regulation,” as this phrase has become part of 
the lingua franca of regulatory wonks and is used even by many excel-
lent scholars whose work I respect (including Professor Orts).  But I 
admonish my students against the phrase for two reasons.  
First, “command and control,” as an adjectival modifier of “regula-
tion,” is redundant.  “Regulation,” like law more generally, refers to 
rules backed up with consequences.  By definition it consists of 
“commands”—not hints or advice.  And every kind of regulation seeks 
to “control” in the sense of shaping incentives and thereby inducing 
changes in certain kinds of behavior or outcomes.  Using “command 
and control” to modify “regulation” therefore adds nothing. 
Second, I ask my students to consider how the words “command 
and control” are used.  These words are almost always used to distin-
guish the writer’s (or speaker’s) own preferred approach from dispar-
aged alternatives that are conveniently placed under the “command 
and control” banner.  Too often this phrase simply undercuts oppos-
ing views by applying a pejorative label to them, sometimes without 
any accompanying substantive argument or analysis. 
What I want my students to learn is how to analyze and assess the 
impact of the crucial differences in the types of commands, the ob-
jects of control, and the nature of the consequences applied across 
different types of regulatory schemes.  Reliance on obfuscating or 
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meaningless phrases like “command and control” impedes the devel-
opment of better policy analysis and empirical knowledge about regu-
lation and regulatory processes. 
This matters because ultimately major choices about regulation 
hinge on answers to empirical questions, where analytical precision is 
crucial.  For example, even though my disagreement with Professor 
Orts centers on a normative question (i.e., whether policymakers 
should adopt collaborative environmental law), our answers are no 
doubt affected by empirical judgments about the consequences of 
adopting collaboration in environmental policymaking.  In my Rebut-
tal, I said that I have never seen anyone provide any credible evidence 
that collaboration works better than alternatives, such as robust par-
ticipation.  Given that various governments have now tried to use col-
laboration numerous times over the course of several decades, it is 
hard not to view the lack of evidence as probative of the merits of the 
case.  At the very least, it is clear that no case has yet been made for 
collaborative environmental law. 
The evidence that has accumulated tends to show, with remark-
able consistency, distinct problems that arise when policymaking is 
oriented around a search for agreement.  Time and again, when ad-
vocates trumpet “successful” examples of collaboration, it takes only a 
little scratching beneath the surface to raise questions and concerns.  
For example, Professor Orts claims that the CALFED program has led 
to “measurable success,” citing work by Jody Freeman and Daniel A. 
Farber.  Although Freeman and Farber did characterize the CALFED 
program quite favorably, they also acknowledged that CALFED’s main 
success had come in the form of new procedures and programs rather 
than improved environmental outcomes. 
A study posted on SSRN earlier this year by two Stanford re-
searchers, Michael W. Wara and W. David Ball, “There It Is.  Take It”:  
Endangered Species and Water Management in the San Francisco Bay Delta, 
26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=987544, 
also casts the CALFED program in a much less favorable light.  Al-
though Wara and Ball are predisposed to the view that “multi-
jurisdictional/multi-agency cooperation, and a focus on consensus . . . 
have many potential benefits,” id. at 1, they conclude that in the CAL-
FED program “consensus and cooperation have not produced re-
sults.”  Id. at 35.  The way Wara and Ball describe it, CALFED has run 
afoul of the same pathology of tractability over importance that I have 
found to afflict other collaborative initiatives.  As Wara and Ball sum-
marize: 
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[CALFED] fails to internalize the costs of environmental protection to 
agricultural and urban water users.  Focus on cooperation has allowed 
agencies to get things done, but the focus has perhaps been on projects 
that can happen rather than projects that need to happen.  As a result, 
four years after CALFED began, the fish are little if any better off. 
Id. at 1.  This is obviously not the place for me, or Professor Orts, to 
offer a full assessment of the CALFED initiative.  Suffice it to say, how-
ever, if CALFED is one of the best examples supporting collaborative 
environmental law, the case for collaboration is much shakier than its 
advocates admit. 
Professor Orts also brings up CALFED to raise a question about 
how to deal with environmental problems that cut across existing gov-
ernmental boundaries and jurisdictions.  In cases where inter-
governmental coordination is needed to direct rules and management 
resources in a way that best advances statutory goals or the overall 
public interest, then seeking agreement between the relevant gov-
ernmental bodies is also presumably necessary.  The same is true at 
the international level where, by definition, agreement between states 
is essential for creating a legal response to global environmental prob-
lems.  If one has no choice, then one has no choice. 
But this does not mean cross-governmental agreements are the 
best, or even a desirable, way of managing resources when choice does 
exist.  Nor does it mean that any agreement is better than no agree-
ment.  Even in domestic and international trans-boundary cases, there 
is absolutely no reason to advocate that government officials make 
getting an agreement their principal objective.  After all, it would 
make little sense to take an ecosystem that wholly exists within a single 
jurisdiction and parcel it up across other jurisdictions just to be able 
to create opportunities for crafting agreements.  But this is essentially 
what collaborative environmental law would imply.  As I said in my 
Rebuttal, taking collaborative environmental law seriously burdens 
domestic environmental law with the same quixotic collective action 
problems that necessarily confront international policymaking. 
For these reasons, the appropriate holy grail for environmental 
policymakers should remain the attainment of the best outcome for 
society.  Will that outcome always be self-evident?  Of course not.  But 
that is only reason to try harder, not to abandon the search. 
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